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Abstract
The consumption of households with liquid nancial assets responds much more
to transitory income shocks than the permanent-income hypothesis predicts. That is,
middle class households with assets act as if they face liquidity constraints. This paper
addresses this puzzling observation with a model of impatient households that face a
large recurring expenditure. In spite of impatience, they save as this expenditure draws
near. We call such saving made in preparation for a foreseeable event at a given future
date \term saving". Term saving reverses the role of assets in the presence of liquidity
constraints. Typically, assets grow following past lucky events; thus assets imply an
abundance of liquidity. Here, assets indicate an impending need for funds and a short-
age of liquidity. The borrowing constraint will bind at the time of the expenditure,
and assets will then be zero. This separates planning up to that time from the rest
of the household's lifetime and thereby shortens its eective horizon. Intertemporal
substitution over a limited period generates a strong consumption response to tempo-
rary income changes. As the expenditure approaches, the eective horizon shortens
further and the household accumulates assets. Hence, households with more assets
have larger consumption responses. We compare a calibrated version of the model with
observations from the 2001 U.S. tax rebate and with evidence on excess smoothness
and persistence of aggregate consumption.
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11 Introduction
Middle-class households usually hold liquid assets. Since liquid wealth can be converted
into current consumption, it seems implausible that such households could face liquidity
constraints. Nevertheless, existing evidence from consumption dynamics following tax rebates
suggests otherwise: Households with nancial assets spend no less, and perhaps more, out of
these temporary income changes than do poorer and more obviously constrained households.
Thus, it appears that substantial liquidity constraints apply also to the middle class.
In this paper, we focus on the marginal propensity to consume, because of its link to
the pervasiveness of liquidity constraints. We model middle-class households as home owners
who hold assets. The model displays high marginal propensities to consume out of temporary
income|even for households with liquid wealth. The key elements of our model are a moti-
vation to save, impatience, and a limitation on debt. The motivation to save is a foreseeable
life-cycle expenditure with exogeneous timing and endogenous size. For tractability, we place
this into a standard innitely-lived household representation of a dynastic life-cycle model.
Impatience implies that the household's subjective discount rate exceeds the interest rate.
In Campbell and Hercowitz (2009), the lower interest rate arises from the savings of more
patient (and thereby wealthier) households. Here, we take the interest rate as given. The
limit on debt mimics typical household debt contracts in the U.S., which require collateral
in the form of a house or car with value exceeding the debt.
Impatience and the periodic expenditure pull the household's assets in opposite directions,
as impatience and risk do in Carroll's (2001) model of precautionary saving. With impatience
alone, the household would always hold the minimum required equity in its durable goods
stock and have no nancial assets. The certain periodic expenditure motivates this household
to save. Such \term saving" nances a deterministic expenditure, while risk motivates pre-
cautionary saving. The two concepts of saving complement each other. In their pure forms,
term saving is motivated by a foreseeable event at a given future date, while precautionary
saving is generated by a constant risk. Hence, precautionary saving leads to a stationary
buer stock of assets; while term saving generates asset cycles. Below, we review evidence
from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances which indicates that term saving for foreseeable
major life-cycle events, such as college education and health care in old age, is at least as
prevalent as precautionary saving among the middle class.
In the model's conict between impatience and saving, impatience wins when the periodic
expenditure is far ahead|and thus the borrowing constraint binds. However, consumption
smoothing eventually motivates the household to start saving ahead of the expenditure so
2that the borrowing constraint ceases to bind. At the time of the expenditure, the household
dissaves and the borrowing constraint binds again.
Zeldes (1984, 1989) distinguished between a currently binding liquidity constraint|the
usual notion|and a globally binding constraint. The latter includes the possibility of the
constraint binding in the future. As he noted, the expectation that a borrowing constraint
will bind in the future eectively shortens the horizon over which a currently unconstrained
household optimizes. This in turn generates a large MPC out of transitory income.
In the present model, all households are globally liquidity constrained, including those
with assets, because the borrowing constraint necessarily binds at the time of the periodic
expenditure. A houshold that is close to the periodic expenditure faces a shorter eective
planning horizon. In the model's calibrated version, households begin to accumulate assets
well ahead of the next expenditure, and thus their Euler equations hold with equality most of
the time. Furthermore, this asset accumulation implies that households with shorter eective
planning horizons have more assets. So, the model predicts that for households with assets,
the observed MPC increases with wealth.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review existing
evidence on consumption behavior that points to liquidity constraints. This includes ob-
servations of the marginal propensity to consume out of tax rebates as well as the excess
smoothness and stickiness of aggregate consumption growth (as dened by Campbell and
Deaton (1989) and Carroll, Slacalek, and Sommer (2009)). Section 3 derives our key result
analytically for a simple version of the model without durable consumption goods and a
xed debt ceiling. We then add durable goods and collateralized debt to the framework as
preparation for the quantitative analysis. Section 4 considers the quantitative implications
of a calibrated version of the model with regard to the facts reviewed in Section 2. In par-
ticular, we show that the liquidity constraints on the middle class can produce high MPCs
for households with wealth and contribute to excess smoothness and stickiness of aggregate
consumption. Section 5 oers concluding remarks.
2 Consumption Evidence
This section reviews existing evidence on consumption dynamics that motivates our ex-
ploration of middle-class liquidity constraints. Cross-sectional observations on households'
consumption decisions in the wake of tax rebates and changes indicate high marginal propen-
sities to consume, especially for households with assets. Many of these households respond to
3tax changes as if they were facing binding liquidity constraints. We also review some of the
analyses of aggregate consumption that suggest widespread presence of liquidity constraints.
2.1 Cross-Sectional Evidence
Shapiro and Slemrod (2003) and Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006) used household surveys
to collect evidence on the marginal propensity to consume out of the tax rebate in 2001 that
began President Bush's ten-year tax cut.1 From July to October, the treasury mailed rebates
of taxes paid under the previously higher rates to most taxpayers. Shapiro and Slemrod
attached questions to the University of Michigan's monthly Survey of Consumers, soliciting
respondents' anticipated use of these funds as well as their expectations about the evolution
of future government spending and taxes. Johnson, Parker, and Souleles added a question
in the Consumer Expenditure Survey to learn about rebate recipients' marginal propensities
to consume.
Both investigations found that consumers spent substantial fractions of their rebates.
Johnson, Parker, and Souleles found that nondurable consumption increased by about two
thirds of the rebate during a six-month period (close to 40 percent during the three-month
period of the rebate, and the remaining in the following three months). Shapiro and Slemrod
found that 22 percent of respondents anticipated spending most of the rebate, while the rest
planned either to reduce their debts or increase their savings. Using plausible distributions
of the marginal propensities to consume across those who would \mostly spend" and \mostly
save", Shapiro and Slemrod calculated an average marginal propensity to consume of about
one third.
The original legislation specied that the tax cuts would sunset in 2011, but Congress
could have either made them permanent or revoked them entirely before then. Shapiro and
Slemrod's respondents indicated that they expected the tax cuts to be temporary. When
asked whether they expect smaller, the same size, or larger tax cuts in the future, 37
percent responded \smaller,"47 percent replied \the same,"and only 16 percent responded
\higher."Regarding future government spending, 26 percent responded that they expect
higher spending, 55 percent expect no change, and only 19 percent expected smaller spend-
ing. Hence, 81 percent expected the same or higher government expenditures. If households
recognize the link between spending and taxes|or, in other words, if they have \Ricardian
beliefs"|they should also expect a short-lived tax cut to engender a future tax increase.
1This rebate authorized by the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001.
4Percentage of Percentage Spending
Stock Ownership Class of Sample Most of Rebate
None 42:8 19:5
$1   $15;000 9:1 13:1
$15;001   $50;000 9:9 18:1
$50;001   $100;000 6:8 26:7
$100;001   $250;000 6:2 33:6
More than $250;000 5:1 22:9
Refused/Don't Know 20:1 25:3
Table 1: Rebate Spending Percentages from Shapiro and Slemrod (2003)
Source: Table 2 of Shapiro and Slemrod (2003)
However, Shapiro and Slemrod found little evidence of a Ricardian link between expecta-
tions about future government spending and consumption responses.
When asset ownership indicates the absence of liquidity constraints, we expect the marginal
propensity to consume to decline with the level of assets. The surprising nding from both
investigations is quite dierent. Shapiro and Slemrod sort their sample by stock ownership,
the only data on wealth in their survey. They divide their sample into six groups, and Table
1 reports their results. Remarkably, the spending fraction increases with stock ownership,
with exceptions for the highest bracket and that with zero-assets. They nd the same pattern
using income levels. Shapiro and Slemrod report in their article's original working paper that
this pattern also arises in regressions with dummy variables for the dierent stock ownership
brackets, while age and other control variables are included. However, the relationship is
statistically indistinguishable from a at line.2
Johnson, Parker, and Souleles sort their sample into three groups by liquid assets. House-
holds in their low-asset group spent much more than those in the middle-asset group, but
those with the most liquid assets also spent more than those in the middle.3 These authors
nd the same pattern after sorting by income, which might proxy for other nancial assets.
Looking beyond the 2001 tax rebates, there is additional evidence suggesting that marginal
2See their Tables 10 through 13 of NBER Working Paper 8672.
3See their Table 5. Note that the latter dierence between the middle and high asset groups is not
statistically signicant.
5propensities to consume out of transitory income are positively correlated with nancial as-
sets, rather than negatively. Parker (1999) examines households in the Consumer Expen-
diture Survey after their earnings pass the Social Security tax wage cap. This produces a
forecastable and temporary increase in after-tax earnings for high-income families. He com-
pares two groups of households, one with enough assets for at least 6 months of nondurable
consumption and another with insucient assets for one month of nondurable consumption.
His estimates of the consumption elasticity with respect to present earnings for the two groups
are 0:8 and 0:5. Only the estimate for the high-asset group is statistically signicant.
Souleles (1999) documents the consumption responses of Consumer Expenditure Survey
respondents to their annual tax refunds. This cash inow is both predictable and transitory.
Hence, under the permanent-income hypothesis, there should be no response. When he
partitions the sample by the ratio of wealth to earnings, he nds that the least wealthy have a
small and statistically insignicant response of total consumption, while the wealthiest spend
between twenty-one and twenty-six cents for every dollar of the rebate. This spending was
apparently concentrated in durable consumption, because the results reverse when examining
food consumption and the \strictly nondurable" consumption dened by Lusardi (1996).
Nevertheless, Souleles (1999) reports nding substantial responses of nondurable consumption
among the wealthy to tax rebates after one quarter.
This body of evidence indicates that many households with assets act as if they are
liquidity constrained. We base our explanation for these observations on households' rational
processing of available information. An alternative is a behavioral explanation of the evidence
based on imperfect incorporation of information into current decisions. This paper is not
aimed at discriminating between these two possibilities. Rather, it only provides a rational-
expectations benchmark model for interpreting these data.
2.2 Time-Series Evidence
The cross-section evidence on consumption reactions to income changes reviewed above has
a direct time-series counterpart in Flavin (1985), who documents \excess sensitivity" of
consumption growth to current income growth. The basic dierence between these two ap-
proaches is that tax cuts are clearly exogenous to the individual household, while in aggregate
time-series current income changes have to be instrumented. Nevertheless, the cross-sectional
evidence is consistent with Flavin's ndings.
Deaton (1987) provides a complementary perspective on aggregate consumption's reac-
tion to income changes that also quanties failure of the permanent-income hypothesis. He
6notes that if income growth is positively serially correlated, permanent income growth is
more volatile than income growth. In this case, the permanent-income hypothesis predicts
that consumption growth should be more volatile than income growth. The empirical results
in Deaton (1987) and Campbell and Deaton (1989) indicate the opposite. Although income
growth is indeed positively serially correlated, its standard deviation substantially exceeds
that of consumption growth. In this sense, there is \excess smoothness" in consumption.
The positive serial correlation of consumption growth, which Carroll, Slacalek, and Sommer
(2009) label \consumption stickiness," is related to excess smoothness: Both features fol-
low from sluggish consumption movements that contradict the white noise prediction of the
permanent-income hypothesis. Carroll, Slacalek, and Sommer (2009) estimate an autocorre-
lation coecient of 0:83 for quarterly consumption growth in the United States.4 Its annual
counterpart equals 0:62.5
Habit formation provides the most straightforward qualitative explanation for excess
smoothness and consumption stickiness, but Dynan (2000) nds little evidence of habits
in the PSID's observations of food consumption. Of course, habits contribute nothing to
reconciling the high MPCs reviewed above with the presence of wealth. In contrast, the
periodically binding liquidity constraints we explore generate (relative to the predictions of
the permanent-income hypothesis) both excess sensitivity to a transitory income change and
excess smoothness and persistence following a permanent income change.
3 The Model
Our model of middle-class consumption and savings decisions adds a motivation to save
to the impatient, borrowing-constrained household in Campbell and Hercowitz (2009). For
this, we give the household utility from a special expenditure with predetermined timing but
endogenous size. This specication keeps the resulting model simple, and it has the added
benet of realism. In 2001, respondents to the Survey of Consumer Finances were asked:
In the next ve to ten years, are there any foreseeable major expenses that you and
your family expect to have to pay for yourselves, such as educational expenses,
purchase of a new home, health care costs, support for other family members, or
anything else?
4See the left-most column of their Table 1.
5For this calculation, we presumed that quarterly consumption growth follows a rst-order autoregression
and calculated the rst autocorrelation of its annual average.
7Among middle-class households with working-age heads|a sample we dene more precisely
below in Section 4.1|58 percent answered armatively. Of those, 61 percent were saving
for the expense at the time of the interview. Put together, about 35 percent of middle-class
households with working-age heads were saving in anticipation of a foreseeable major expense.
This percentage is similar to the fraction of households reporting that they sometimes save
for precautionary reasons, 33 percent.6
To keep the model as simple as possible, we interpret \foreseeable" as \certain on a given
date." The model household derives utility from a special periodic expenditure and from
regular consumption. We intend the periodic expenditure to represent major expenses as in
the question above.7 The household lives forever and is impatient relative to the market rate
of interest. In spite of the impatience, the household saves in anticipation of the periodic
expenditure. Recall from the introduction that a household is globally liquidity constrained
if its borrowing constraint either binds in the present or is expected to bind in the future.
Term saving induced by the periodic expenditure generates a meaningful dierence between
current and global liquidity constraints: As we show later, the borrowing constraint should
bind at least at the time of the expenditure. Hence, to dierent degrees, the household will
always be liquidity constrained in the global sense.
Since the vast majority of household debt is collateralized by durable goods, such as
homes and cars, explicitly accounting for collateral increases the empirical relevance of any
quantitative investigation of liquidity constraints. Nevertheless, the main features of our
model can be shown with nondurable consumption only. Accordingly, we rst derive the key
results qualitatively from that basic version of the model, and then conclude this section by
extending it for the quantitative investigation.
6For this calculation, we used responses to the question \Now I'd like to ask you a few questions about
your family's savings. People have dierent reasons for saving, even though they may not be saving all the
time. What are your family's most important reasons for saving?" Each respondent can give up to six
answers. We assigned precautionary motives to a household if any of these answers was: \Reserves in case of
unemployment," \In case of illness; medical/dental expenses," \Emergencies; `rainy days'; other unexpected
needs; for `security' and independence," or \Liquidity; to have cash available/on hand." The fraction of
households that reported precautionary motives for saving and also said they were saving for a foreseeable
major expenditure was 11 percent.
7The Appendix presents an explicit overlapping-generations life-cycle model with both the periodic life-
cycle expenditure and tax-advantaged retirement accounts. In Subsection 3.6 below we review that model
and comment on its equivalence to the present one.
83.1 The Basic Model
The model proceeds in discrete time, and we denote a point in time as a \year". A single
innitely lived household values two goods, standard consumption and periodic consumption.





tflnCt + t lnMtg (1)
with 0 <  < 1. Here, the indicator t follows a cycle with t =  > 0 every  years and
t = 0 at other times. This specication generates a periodic expenditure with exogenous
timing and endogenous size. De Nardi, French, and Jones (2009) use a similar preference
specication to study endogenous medical expenditure choices in old age.
The household is endowed with one unit of labor which it supplies inelastically at the
wage rate Wt: Denote lump-sum taxes with Tt and net nancial assets at the end of the
previous year with At: The household's budget constraint is
Ct = Wt   Tt + RAt   At+1   Mt; (2)
where R is the gross interest rate, assumed to be constant. We assume that R < 1, so the
household is impatient.8
The household's choices of all goods must satisfy nonnegativity constraints. Furthermore,
the household faces the standard borrowing constraint
At+1  0: (3)
Given A0; the household chooses sequences of Ct; Mt and At+1 to maximize its utility subject
to the sequence of nonnegativity and budget constraints.
Denote the Lagrange multipliers on the year t budget and borrowing constraints with 	t





 t = 	t   R	t+1; (5)
	tMt = t: (6)
8See Campbell and Hercowitz (2009) for a general equilibrium environment in which such a low interest
rate arises endogenously from trade with a more patient household.
9Without borrowing constraints, 	t equals the marginal current utility of lifetime resources.
Here, it represents the marginal value of current resources. The multiplier  t equals the
marginal value of relaxing the borrowing constraint, which is the deviation from the standard
Euler equation;  t is zero when the borrowing constraint is slack. Because 	t is always
positive, the periodic expenditure Mt is positive when t > 0 and zero otherwise. We
elaborate on the life-cycle interpretation of Mt below in Section 3.6.
3.2 The Nonstochastic Cycle
Because of the periodic changes in preferences, the household's problem has no steady state,
even if wages and taxes remain unchanged. Nevertheless, there does exist a nonstochastic
cycle when Wt and Tt are constant. This cycle is the analogue of a steady state in our model,
so we begin with the cycle's characterization, and focus in particular on term saving, i.e., the
level of assets along the cycle. For this, we denote ordinary consumption and assets  years
after the most recent periodic expenditure in a nonstochastic cycle with C and A.9









The corresponding budget constraints are
C
 + A
+1 = W   T + RA
 for  = 1;2;:::;   1;
(1 + )C
 + A
1 = W   T + RA
:
We replaced here the periodic expenditure with its optimal level from (4) and (6), C.
To solve these conditions, it is helpful to begin with the case of  = 0, which corresponds
to the standard optimization under impatience. The only path for A and C satisfying
these conditions is the standard steady state for impatient agents in which the borrowing
constraint always binds and the household consumes all labor earnings. That is, A = 0 and
C = W   T in all periods, and hence (7) and (8) hold with strict inequalities.
9Our model has a deterministic asset cycle in common with the models of Baumol (1952) and Tobin
(1956). This and those models, however, dier in key respects. There, the length of the cycle is the key
endogenous variable, while here it is exogenous. We focus is on the link between the asset cycle and liquidity
constraints, while those models focused on the link between assets and money demand.
10Raising  above zero generates a positive M every  years. However, if  is less than
^   (R)
 1   1, then the borrowing constraint still binds at all times. That is, for  =
1;:::;   1, C = W   T, and C = (W   T)=(1 + ): Thus, conditions (7) and (8) still
hold with strict inequalities. Mechanically, this follows from the fact that the reduction of





to an equality while C 1 still equals W   T. Intuitively, the anticipated reduction in con-
sumption is too small to induce the household to save in year   1 towards the expenditure
in year , so the household nances the expenditure only by reducing C.
Now, suppose that  > ^  and dene ^  1  (R) 2(R+1) 1 > ^ . When  = ^ mu
 1,





That is, the borrowing constraint in cycle year    2 does not bind, but the household
nevertheless saves nothing. If  is less than ^ mu
 1, then the borrowing constraint in cycle
year  2 binds; A1 = A2 =  = A 1 = 0; and A > 0. If instead  > ^  1, then A 1 > 0.
Applying this reasoning to higher and higher values of  yields the following result.
Proposition 1 There exist positive and nite threshold values of , ^ 2 > ^ 3 >  > ^ ,
such that A > 0 if and only if  > ^ .
Note that progressively higher values of  generate positive assets for year    1 rst,
then for year    2; and so on backwards until year 1 of the cycle. The constraint always
binds in the cycle's nal year, so that A1 = 0:10 We conclude that the borrowing constraint
\switches o" at most once during the cycle. It switches back on in the year of the special
expenditure. We use this result to link the level of assets to the stage in the cycle.
Proposition 2 Assume that the constraint switches o in year  of the deterministic cycle,
where 1   < : Then, because W   T  C > C+1 >  > C 1, we have that
A+1 < A+2 < ::: < A:
In words, the saving towards the next periodic expenditure monotonically increases the level
of assets.
10The borrowing constraint must bind at some point along any deterministic path, not just one which
forms a nonstochastic cycle. Assume otherwise, so that for some t At0 > 0 for all t0  t. This cannot be
the optimal behavior, because increasing Ct; and hence all subsequent consumption levels, at the expense of
reducing all future asset levels, gives higher present value utility.
113.3 Shortening of the Planning Horizon and the MPC
Zeldes (1984) noted that a binding borrowing constraint in the future works like a terminal
condition which shortens the eective planning horizon. The household's response to an
unanticipated temporary increase in Wt   Tt on the nonstochastic cycle illustrates this. If
the borrowing constraint binds in the year of the increase, then MPC = 1 as expected. If
instead, the borrowing constraint is slack then, the household allocates the increase in current
income across consumption between the present year in the cycle, , and the next time the










This exceeds the marginal propensity to consume of an unconstrained household facing the
interest rate  1 (1 ) if and only if  < =(1 ).11 The model's calibration satises this
condition comfortably, so we proceed under this assumption.
We began this paper highlighting the empirical puzzle of MPCs substantially larger than
the rate of interest for households with wealth. To see our model's implications for these
observations, we dierentiate MPC above with respect to . The upper bound for  signs
the derivative positively. Therefore, we conclude:
Proposition 3 If  < =(1 ), and if the borrowing constraint becomes slack in year  of
the cycle, then MPC < MPC+1 <  < MPC 1.
Propositions 2 and 3 together imply that if we sampled households uniformly distributed
across the deterministic cycle, we would nd that MPCt covaries positively with At among
households with assets.
3.4 Persistence of Consumption Growth
We now turn to the model's implications for the persistence and volatility of consumption
growth. Raising income permanently by one percent increases the household's assets per-
manently by the same percentage. This long-run connection between assets and income is
absent from the standard model of an unconstrained household.12 This connection generates
11If instead,  > =(1   ), then the periodic expenditure has such a large share that most of the temporary
increase goes towards it.
12Consumption of a standard permanent-income household adjusts immediately and fully to an unexpected
permanent wage increase, leaving assets unchanged.
12persistence of aggregate consumption growth, because the household accumulates the new
target asset level gradually.
To see this, we consider the consumption of  households|each of which begins from
a dierent point on the nonstochastic cycle|following an unexpected and permanent one
percent increase in W  T. Since we are interested in the consumption decisions of households
with positive assets, we proceed with the assumption that  > ^ : We begin with the response
of a household which just undertook its periodic expenditure, and hence has currently no
assets. An unexpected and permanent wage increase of one percent raises the value of all
resources available before the next periodic consumption by one percent. The homotheticity
of the household's preferences requires that the consumption of all goods also rises by one
percent. This implies that its asset holdings at every date also rise, due to higher saving for the
next periodic expenditure. For this household, the adjustment of assets and consumption is
immediate because the entire eective planning horizon is still ahead. Therefore, consumption
growth of a household beginning with no assets displays no persistence.
In contrast, if the household has positive assets, the shock raises the value of total re-
sources available before the next periodic expenditure by less than one percent if the house-
hold has assets, so consumption between the period of the shock and the next periodic
expenditure goes up by less than one percent. The household completes its consumption
adjustment only after the next periodic expenditure.
Aggregating consumption responses of households with assets with those from households
without assets yields an aggregate consumption series displaying persistence following an
unexpected wage change. If wage innovations hit these households repeatedly, we would
also nd that their aggregate consumption growth has a smaller variance than does income
growth. This follows automatically from the representation of consumption and income
growth as moving averages of current and (for consumption) lagged income shocks. The
variance of either series equals the sum of the squared moving average coecients, and
Jensen's inequality implies that this is maximized by concentrating all of the response in one
period, which is exactly what the moving average for income does by assumption. Since the
response of consumption growth is more gradual, its unconditional variance is lower.13
13In Gal 's (1990) innite-horizon framework, retirement savings mitigate the wealth eect of an income
innovation and thereby reduce consumption volatility. This qualitatively resembles the eects of term saving
on consumption volatility here, but Gal  nds that the variance of aggregate consumption growth still exceeds
that of income growth in his calibrated model.
133.5 The Model with Durable Goods
A xed constraint on net assets like At+1  0 has tractability but lacks realism. Middle-class
households often carry substantial debts, and the vast majority of these are collateralized by
durable goods.14 To better equip the model for quantitative work, we extend it with durable
goods|which we think of as including housing|and collateralized debt.
Denote the stock of durable goods at the beginning of the year with St. We assume that
the corresponding service ow is proportional to this stock, which depreciates at the constant
rate . A simple specication for collateral value is
Vt = (1   )St; (11)
where  is a required equity share|an exogenous parameter|corresponding to the down-
payment rate. Limiting borrowing to the value of collateral yields
At+1   Vt+1: (12)
The denition of Vt in (11) implies that the good's collateral value depreciates at the
same rate as its service ow, . We can use this to express the accumulation of collateral
value with the standard perpetual-inventory form:
Vt+1 = (1   )Vt + (1   )(St+1   (1   )St): (13)
If the borrowing constraint always binds, then (13) requires that collateralized debt be
amortized at the physical depreciation rate. In reality, amortized mortgages and typical
automobile loans require the borrower to repay the loan faster than this, so that the borrower's
equity share rises over time. We embody this into the model by supposing that a good's
collateral value depreciates faster than the ow of services it generates. This replaces the
rst instance of  in (13) with the depreciation rate of a durable's collateral value, .
Vt+1 = (1   )Vt + (1   )(St+1   (1   )St): (14)
This perpetual-inventory collateral accumulation equation reduces to (11) if  = . When
 > ; the required equity share for a given purchase increases as the good ages.
We now complete the extension by adapting the household's preferences and budget
constraint to the presence of durable goods.
14Aizcorbe, Kennickell, and Moore (2003) use the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances and estimate that




t f(1   )lnCt + lnSt + t lnMtg; 0 <  < 1; 0 <  < 1; (15)
Ct = Wt   Tt + RAt + (1   )St   At+1   St+1   Mt: (16)
The household's problem is to choose sequences of Ct; Mt, Vt+1, At+1, and St+1 to max-
imize utility subject to the sequences of budget, borrowing, and collateral accumulation
constraints, and the initial stocks, V0; A0 and S0: We continue to denote the Lagrange multi-
pliers on the budget and borrowing constraints with 	t and  t, and denote the multiplier on
the collateral accumulation constraint with t. After the obvious change to the expression
for the marginal utility of ordinary non-durable consumption, the rst-order conditions from
the basic model apply to this extension. The additional conditions for the optimal choices of
St+1 and Vt+1 are
t =  t + (1   )t+1; (17)
	t   t (1   ) = 

St+1
+  (1   )(	t+1   t+1 (1   )): (18)
Both of these equations have straightforward interpretations. Iterating (17) forward ex-
presses t as the utility value of relaxing the present and future borrowing constraints by
marginally increasing collateral value. Since  t+j must exceed zero for some j  0, t is posi-
tive. Its magnitude summarizes the present importance of anticipated borrowing constraints.
Hence, t expresses the degree to which the household is globally constrained.
If we articially set t and t+1 to zero, then (18) reduces to the standard rst-order
condition for optimal investment in durable goods. This reveals that this household subtracts
the marginal utility from the accompanying expansion of collateral, t (1   ) from the utility
cost of durable goods consumption in year t.
3.6 A Life-Cycle Interpretation of the Model
We have motivated our innite-horizon model's periodic expenditure as reecting life-cycle
events. We give this motivation an explicit foundation in the Appendix which presents a
life-cycle overlapping generations model of a dynasty with altruistic members. That model
15features tax-advantaged Individual Retirement Accounts. We show that it is identical to
the innite horizon model around its deterministic cycle if the dynasty fully exploits its IRA
investment opportunities in spite of its impatience. Here we discuss the model's setup and
summarize the results of its analysis. This discussion omits durable goods and includes only
the standard borrowing constraint that allows no debt. The Appendix discusses the natural
extension with durable goods and collateralized household debt.
The model of the Appendix consists of a dynasty with  overlapping generations. Every
 years a new member is born, and he dies  years later. In the rst (   1) years of life,
an individual earns an annual after-tax labor income of WtN by inelastically supplying N
units of labor per year. In the last  years, the individual is retired and earns nothing. All
members pay annual lump-sum taxes Tt. Member i derives utility from ordinary nondurable
consumption, Ci
t; and end-of-life care, Mi









t =  > 0 in the nal year of life and i
t = 0 in other years. We call Mi
t \end-of-life
care" only for the sake of concreteness. The analysis of this model would be identical if we
instead supposed that Mi
t represents some other life-cycle expenditure, such as education
in the rst period of life. Dynasty members discount future utility at the common rate
0 <  < 1; and they are perfectly altruisitc towards the dynasty's other born and unborn
individuals.
The dynasty can save either by accumulating ordinary bonds or by investing in its working
members' Individual Retirement Accounts. The bond's rate of return equals R < 1=, so
the dynasty is impatient in the usual sense. The United States exempts the capital income
of IRA investments from taxation, so we assume that an IRA's rate of return in the dynastic
model satises R? > R. As in the United States, each individual's annual contributions to
the IRA may not exceed a maximum, and each retiree's annual withdrawals must exceed a
minimum fraction of the remaining balance.
Dynastic optimization requires equalization of all members' marginal utilities from ordi-
nary consumption (Ci
t = Ci0
t ) and equalization of marginal utility from ordinary consumption
and end-of-life care for the oldest living member (Mi
t = Ci
ti
t). In the Appendix, we use these
conditions to express the dynasty's utility function (which sums the utilities of all born and
unborn members) as the utility function in (1). We then show that if  is not too low and
the shocks to earnings are small, then the IRA's tax advantage generates a corner solution:
All working individuals make the maximum contribution, and all retirees make the minimum
16withdrawal. Specically, obtaining this corner solution requires R? > 1: 15 With this result
in hand, we can dene the dynasty's net labor income as the earnings of its working mem-
bers net of their IRA contributions plus the retired member's IRA withdrawal. Since the
dynasty's utility function and budget constraints are identical to those of the innitly lived
household, the dynastic model's solution corresponds exactly to the model in this section.
We also assume that the IRA contribution ceiling is such that the only transfers across
dynasty members are from workers to retirees to nance their share in the end-of-life care.
In this case, the ratio of nonretirement assets to disposable income is equalized across all
members of the dynasty. This is realistic in the presence of a pay-as-you-go public pension,
which, for simplicity we omit from the model. For working members, disposable income
is labor income net of taxes and pension funds contributions, and for retirees it is pension
income. This equalization will be relevant for the calibration of the model, because the
ratio of nonretirement assets of working age individuals to their disposable labor income is
interpreted as reecting the dynasty's optimal decisions.
4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we calculate the calibrated model's responses to transitory income changes
and balanced-budget tax experiments and then discuss the evidence in Section 2.1 from
the model's perspective. Comparing the results with the evidence requires us to resolve
a nancial indeterminacy: Since the household pays the same interest rate on debt as it
receives on savings, it can save either by purchasing assets or by accumulating equity in its
durable goods. We resolve this by assuming that repaying debts faster than required and
then extracting the funds with new borrowing incurs a small cost. To avoid it, the household
repays its debt at the minimum required pace. Under this assumption, we measure the
household's gross debt with Vt and its gross assets equal At + Vt  A
g
t.
As we noted above, the periodic expenditure motivates an impatient household to save.
Accordingly, we choose the parameters governing saving ( and ) using observations of
middle class households' nancial assets from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances. After
introducing that evidence, this section presents the model's calibrated parameters and dis-
cusses its nonstochastic cycle. It then proceeds with the calculation of households' responses
15We require R? > 1 to obtain a corner solution, but this is is not sucient when  > 1. In the Appendix
we derive a condition on , R, and R? sucient for a corner solution in the dynastic model's deterministic
cycle, equation (A14).
17to a temporary wage increase and to several intertemporally-balanced tax reductions. We
compare the latter to the evidence from the 2001 tax cuts surveyed above. We also we
use the model to quantitatively interpret excess smoothness and persistence in aggregate
consumption.
4.1 Middle Class Financial Assets
The evidence on the marginal propensity to consume surveyed above comes primarily from
the tax rebates of 2001, so we draw our observations from the 2001 Survey of Consumer
Finances. For each surveyed household, the SCF contains the values of several nancial
assets (including IRA accounts not associated with an employer) as of the interview date. It
also reports the year 2000 pre-tax labor income of both the respondent and her or his spouse,
contributions to employer-sponsored retirement savings programs, pre-tax capital income,
and the household's 2000 tax year Adjusted Gross Income.
In the model, the consumption and saving decisions are homogeneous of degree one in net
labor income. Hence, we consider the nancial assets of each household relative to its dispos-
able labor income. For the construction of both variables in this ratio, we follow the dynastic
interpretation of our model in Section 3.6 and the Appendix. The empirical counterpart of A
g
t
is nancial assets excluding balances in tax-advantaged retirement accounts: stocks, bonds,
as well as balances in checking, savings, money market, and mutual fund accounts. For
the measurement of disposable labor income, we rst calculate the household's income taxes
paid by applying the reported AGI to the year 2000 tax table. We then apportion this be-
tween labor and capital using reported capital income. To get our measure of after-tax labor
income, we subtract the resulting labor income taxes, the household's FICA and Medicare
taxes, contributions to employer-sponsored retirement plans, and IRA contributions from the
household's wages, salaries, and self-employment earnings.16
We intend our model household to represent the working middle class, so we apply several
screens to the data. We rst keep only households with heads between 25 and 64 years old
with positive after-tax labor income. We remove the rich by dropping the wealthiest ve
percent of the remaining households, and we remove the poor by deleting any household
that received Unemployment Insurance Benets, Food Stamps, or TANF payments in the
previous year. The initial sample represents 106 million households. Table 2 reports the
16The 2001 SCF has no information on year 2000 IRA contributions, but it does list all of the house-
hold's IRA accounts. Our calculations suppose that each individual with an IRA made the maximum legal
contribution ($2,000).
18Households Represented in Original Sample, 106,493,608
& with heads between 25 and 64 years old, 78,079,336
& with positive after-tax labor income, 68,659,384
& are among least wealthy 95% of remaining households, 65,232,296
& that received no UI, Food Stamps, or TANF, 59,728,852
Table 2: Number of Households Represented in the 2001 SCF
number of households remaining after each screen. The nal sample represents 60 million
households.
Table 3 reports the income-weighted average ratios of wealth to disposable labor income.
The leftmost cell's estimate uses the entire screened sample. The other cells report the aver-
age ratios by deciles of this ratio. For the complete sample, the average ratio is 54:9 percent.
This greatly exceeds the ratio for the fth decile, 12:1 percent, which approximates the dis-
tribution's median. Apparently wealth is concentrated in this sample in spite of omitting
the very wealthy and poor. Qualitatively, the model's deterministic cycle can generate such
concentration because the household saves at an increasing rate for the next periodic expen-
diture. We will use the overall average ratio of assets to disposable labor income to calibrate
the model, and then compare in Section 4.3 the resulting model's distribution of wealth with
the evidence presented here.17
4.2 Calibration
We now proceed to calibrate the model's parameters. For this we combine the calibration
strategy from Campbell and Hercowitz (2009) with the wealth observations from Table 3
and considerations from the life-cycle interpretation of the model. We interpret each of the
model's units of time as one year, and set R = 1:04: The physical depreciation rate  is set at
the stock-weighted average of those for vehicles and residences from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis Fixed Reproducible Tangible Wealth, 0:04.
17In the simplest overlapping generations model without altruism, households accumulate wealth as they
age to fund consumption in retirement. Thus, one might suspect that the wealth heterogeneity in Table
3 reects age heterogeneity. We have investigated this possibility by regressing the wealth to labor-income
ratio on the household head's age and age squared. Although the estimated regression indicates that the
ratio does rise with age, its R2 is less than 1 percent. Thus, the data reveal substantial wealth heterogeneity
across middle-class households of the same age. It is this heterogeneity that our model addresses.
19Full Deciles
Sample 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
54.9 0.2 1.9 4.2 7.3 12.1 19.4 31.3 55.0 111.7 336.5
Table 3: Ratios of Financial Assets to Annual Disposable Labor Income (100)
Note: Each cell reports a weighted average of nonretirement nancial assets to labor income net of federal
income taxes, Social Security taxes, and contributions to tax-advantaged retirement accounts. The leftmost
cell uses the entire sample, while the remaining cells use observations grouped by deciles of this ratio.
The extensive deregulation of the mortgage market in late 1970s and early 1980s changed
the eective equity requirements for household debt. Since we wish to compare our model's
dynamics with observations from the 2001 tax cut, we calibrate  and  using observations
from loan contracts relevant for that year. The down-payment rate is a weighted average
of those for vehicles and residences. For cars, the average loan-to-value ratio from Federal
Reserve Statistical Release G19 over the 1995-2004 period is 0:92. For homes, existing data
on rst loan-to-value ratios over this period is not useful because \down payment assistance"
loans can lower the eective equity share held at purchase. We use observations from the
2001 Survey of Consumer Finances from households who purchased homes in the 12 months
preceding the interview. Their average equity share is 0:175. We expect households to
accumulate very little additional equity in the rst year of home ownership, so we take this
as a measure of the eective down-payment rate. The relevant weighted average of these two
down payment rates is  = 0:108.18 We set  to 0:074, four times the quarterly rate of 0:0186
used in Campbell and Hercowitz (2009).
The four remaining parameters are , , , and . For guidance calibrating the rst
three, we draw upon the life-cycle version of the model as discussed in Section 3.6 and the
Appendix. As mentioned there, the IRA tax advantage generates corner solutions for IRA
contributions and withdrawals if impatience is not too strong. Specically, the requirement
is that R? > 1: Applying a marginal tax rate of 30 percent to R = 1:04 yields R? =
1 + (R   1)=(1   0:3) = 1:0595. We choose  = 1=1:055, which satises this condition and
exceeds the interest rate R by one and a half percentage points.19
18See Appendix A of Campbell and Hercowitz (2009) for details on the calculation of .
19Given R = 1:04 and R? = 1:0595, our choice of  = 1=1:055 satises R? > 1 and the more stringent
sucient condition in equation (A14). We note here that the actual value of R? has no bearing on our
analysis beyond the discipline it provides in choosing .
20 R 1      
0.95 0.96 0.42 10 1.82 0.108 0.074 0.040
Table 4: Calibrated Parameter Values
In the dynastic model, with the suitably chosen IRA contribution ceiling, ordinary saving
nances only the periodic expenditure. Therefore, observations of nonretirement assets of
working-age individuals can be used to infer the size of the periodic expenditures (determined
by ) and the number of years between them (). In practice, we arbitrarily set  to ten
years, although the results are nearly the same with nine and eleven years. We then choose 
to match the income-weighted average ratio of nonretirement nancial wealth to disposable
labor income from Table 3, 54:9 percent. We select  to match the share of total personal
consumption expenditures accounted for by nondurable goods and nonhousing services. Over
the 1983{2006 period, this equaled 21:1 percent. Our choice of  depends on that for ,
and vise versa. Therefore, calibration requires the straightforward solution of two nonlinear
equations in two unknowns. Table 4 lists the resulting parameter values.
4.3 The Deterministic Cycle
With the calibrated parameter values in hand, we calculate the extended model's deter-
ministic cycle numerically. Figure 1 plots the household's consumption choices, assets, and
Lagrange multipliers along the calibrated model's computed nonstochastic cycle. We place
the periodic expenditure in the cycle's nal year and normalize W   T to one.
The liquidity constraint binds in only one of the cycle's years, that of the periodic expen-
diture. Otherwise, the Euler equation holds and  t = 0: Since t equals a present discounted
value of current and future values of  t, it always exceeds zero. It grows as the periodic
expenditure and the accompanying binding borrowing constraint approach. For this reason,
we measure the degree to which the household is globally liquidity constrained at any date
with t. During the years in which the Euler equation holds it requires both Ct and St+1 to
decline at the rate 1=R   1:
The lower right panel shows Ag. As in the basic model without durable goods, gross
nancial assets grow at an increasing rate as the household approaches the periodic expen-
diture. If individuals are uniformly distributed over the expenditure cycle, a sample drawn
from this model at the beginning of the year would have average ratios of assets to net labor








































































































































































































































































































































22Table 3. In the data, the ratio of the fth decile's average to the mean is 0:22, while in the
model, this ratio is 0:69. Hence, inequality in the model is signicantly lower than in the
middle-class sample for that table.
4.4 Dynamic Responses to a Temporary Income Change
Figure 2 shows the responses of nondurable consumption to a transitory, unexpected, and
marginal transfer of labor income. Each panel plots a dierent timing of the transfer, from
 = 1; i.e., one year after the expenditure, to  = 10; the year of the expenditure. The
response is expressed as a percentage of the transfer, so its value in the year of the transfer
is a partial marginal propensity to consume (which only reects nondurable purchases).
The highest response is 78 percent corresponding to  = 10. In this year the borrowing
constraint binds, which explains the high response. When the transfer is received in years 1
to 9; i.e., when the borrowing constraint does not bind, the responses are smaller and range
from 6 percent to 14 percent. The interesting feature of these responses is that they increase
as the next periodic expenditure gets closer. This happens simultaneously with increasing
asset levels. Hence, the conclusion of Proposition 3 holds good for this calibration of the
extended model.
Figure 2 also shows that the household smooths consumption over a short horizon that
extends only until the next periodic expenditure. For example, when  = 5; the response
is smooth at the 7 percent level for four years. Seven years after the periodic expenditure,
consumption falls back to its initial level. We demonstrated analytically the shortened plan-
ning horizon in the basic model without durable goods or collateralized debt. We see here
that the binding borrowing constraint eectively reduces the planning horizon in spite of the
intertemporal connections these changes introduced.
Figure 3 portrays the corresponding impulse responses for durable goods purchases. These
responses are much larger than those for nondurable consumption because households use
part of the windfall as down payments on durable goods. Credit nances the purchase's
balance. Aside from their far greater magnitudes, these initial responses resemble those of
nondurable consumption. They increase from 55 percent when the expenditure is nine years
away to 151 percent in the year before the expenditure. In the expenditure year (when the
borrowing constraint binds) it equals 206 percent. The decreases of durable purchases in
future years show that these increases are mostly changes in the timing of purchases that
would have occurred before the next periodic expenditure without the windfall.20
20We remind the reader that these percentages are expressed relative to the temporary wage increase and






































2 4 6 8 10
78 78 78
 = 10
Each panel plots the responses of nondurable consumption over a 10-year horizon to a marginal increase
in income lasting one year. All responses are scaled relative to the income change, so their values in year
one can be interpreted as partial marginal propensities to consume. In the headings,  refers to the year of
the household's deterministic cycle in which the income change occurs. The periodic expenditure coincides
with the temporary increase for  = 10. Tick marks indicate the household's initial response, its maximum
response, and the maximum response across all households. The horizontal helper lines mark 20, 40, and 60
percent of the income increase. The income change occurs in year 1. Please see the text for further details.




















































Each panel plots the responses of durable consumption purchases over a 10-year horizon to a marginal increase
in income lasting one year. All responses are scaled relative to the income change, so their values in year one
can be interpreted as partial marginal propensities to consume. In the headings,  refers to the year of the
household's deterministic cycle in which the income change occurs. The periodic expenditure coincides with
the temporary increase for  = 10. Tick marks indicate the household's maximum and minimum responses
as well as the maximum and minimum responses across all households. The income change occurs in year 1.
Please see the text for further details.
254.5 Dynamic Responses to a Tax Cut
We now proceed to compute the responses to a tax cut, and compare the results to the
eects of the 2001 tax cut reviewed in Section 2.1. The simulation is based on the following
assumptions about the households' perceptions of scal policy: (a) The tax cut is unexpected
when implemented, (b) the tax cut does not last very long, (c) the future path of government
spending remains unchanged, and (d) the government increases future taxes permanently to
pay the interest on the additional government debt incurred.
We consider three possibilities for the tax cut's duration, one, three, and ve years.
In all cases we keep the tax cut's per year magnitude the same, so the permanent tax
increases that follow them increase with the tax cut's duration. Figures 4 and 5 are the
counterparts to Figures 2 and 3 for the experiment with a one-year tax cut. As expected,
raising future taxes to balance the government budget generally lowers the responses of both
durable and nondurable goods. However, these changes are in general small. Hence, the
consumption response following a temporary income windfall changes little if future after-
tax income drops to balance the government budget. This reects the shortened planning
horizon generated by the anticipation of a binding borrowing constraint. In light of this
result, Shapiro and Slemrod's puzzling nding that households' consumption responses to
the 2001 tax rebates have no association with their stated expectations about future changes
to government spending and taxes makes sense.
The experiment with a three-year-long tax cut (not shown) generates higher responses
than the one-year tax cut in cycle years 1    9. This follows from consumption smoothing
of a more prolonged tax cut over a short horizon. When the borrowing constraint does bind
( = 10) the response is almost identical to the analogous response from the one-year tax
cut. This is what the basic model leads us to expect. Then, when the household is currently
constrained, future income has no inuence on current consumption. The addition of durable
goods and collateralized debt hardly changes this conclusion. The experiment with a ve-
year-long tax cut yields similar but quantitatively larger results for the unconstrained periods.
We now compare these results with the evidence on the tendency to spend most of the
rebate by wealth groups presented by Shapiro and Slemrod.21 For this, we adopt their
assumption of a positive link between the probability of a survey respondent declaring that
not relative to the initial durable goods stock. Therefore, the negative responses after the initial windfall
reect a decrease in durable purchases rather than an outright sale of durable goods.
21Recall from Section 2.1 that Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006) whose point estimate of the relationship
between the marginal propensity to consume and household wealth was U-shaped. We interpret their ndings
as reinforcing those of Shapiro and Slemrod (2003). We focus on their results only for parsimony.






































2 4 6 8 10
77 77 77
 = 10
Each panel plots the responses of nondurable consumption over a 10-year horizon to a small tax cut lasting
one year followed by a permanent tax increase that balances the government's intertemporal budget. All
responses are scaled relative to the tax cut, so their values in year one can be interpreted as partial marginal
propensities to consume. In the headings,  refers to the year of the household's deterministic cycle in
which the tax cut occurs. The periodic expenditure coincides with the temporary tax cut for  = 10. Tick
marks indicate the household's initial response, its maximum response, and the maximum response across
all households. The horizontal helper lines mark 20, 40, and 60 percent of the income increase. The tax cut
occurs in year 1. Please see the text for further details.




















































Each panel plots the responses of durable consumption purchases over a 10-year horizon to a small tax cut
lasting one year followed by a permanent tax increase that balances the government's intertemporal budget.
All responses are scaled relative to the tax cut, so their values in year one can be interpreted as partial
marginal propensities to consume. In the headings,  refers to the year of the household's deterministic cycle
in which the tax cut occurs. The periodic expenditure coincides with the temporary tax cut for  = 10. Tick
marks indicate the household's minimum and maximum responses as well as the minimum and maximum
responses across all households. The tax cut occurs in year 1. Please see the text for further details.
28she would spend most of her rebate and her actual (unobserved) MPC. Assuming also
that their typical survey respondent considers only the down payment for a durable good
purchase as expenditure|and not the additional debt incurred|we multiply the response
of durable good purchases by the required down payment rate ( = 0:108) before adding it
to the contemporaneous response of non-durable consumption. We dene the sum of these
two components as the overall marginal propsensity to consume (MPC), which we tabulate
in Table 5 by the cycle year of the tax cut or transfer, along with that year's asset level. We
measure each household's gross assets as the average of their values at the beginning and end
of the year{ -as in reality assets may be adjusted continuously. The rst column of Table
5 lists , the year of the household's nonstochastic cycle in which the experiment begins.
The next column presents gross assets, and the remaining columns give the MPCs from the
experiments.
The most noticeable feature of Table 5 is the positive association between gross nancial
assets and the marginal propensity to consume. The relationship, however, is not monotonic;
the highest MPC does not match the highest level of assets; it corresponds to  = 10, i.e., the
year when the borrowing constraint binds.22 Hence, the MPCs decrease when assets exceed
0:7. Nevertheless, they exceed the MPCs for households with low assets. This resembles
the link found by Shapiro and Slemrod, as reported in Table 1, for households with positive
stocks. They explain this positive correlation as adjustment of assets to a target level:
Individuals with low assets spend relatively little in order to build up their assets towards
the target, while those with high assets do the opposite.
Shapiro and Slemrod's explanation and ours contrast each other in an interesting way.
In their target-assets argument, high assets imply temporarily high consumption because the
household dissaves. Here, high assets imply temporarily low consumption; the borrowing
constraint will bind soon, and consumption smoothing over the short remaining horizon
generates low consumption in the present as well. If we model the target-asset behavior with
a quadratic term on the deviation of assets from target, saving involves a positive marginal
cost when assets exceed the target. Hence, when a consumer in that framework receives
temporary income while having high assets, her consumption reacts strongly in spite of her
low marginal utility, because saving is costly. The household in the present model has a strong
consumption response because of high marginal utility. Since he is globally constrained, his
response qualitatively resembles that of a currently borrowing constrained individual.
22For  = 10, assets are not the highest in Table 5 because they average the highest beginning-of-period
level A with the lowest end-of-period level A1 = 0.
29Gross One Year Balanced-Budget Tax Cut for
 Assets(i) Transfer One Year Three Years Five Years
1 0.03 12 8 25 44
2 0.10 12 9 28 48
3 0.20 13 10 31 54
4 0.32 14 11 35 61
5 0.46 16 13 40 70
6 0.63 18 15 47 82
7 0.82 20 18 57 77
8 1.04 24 22 70 70
9 1.29 30 29 59 59
10 0.72 100 100 100 100
Table 5: The MPC and Financial Assets





As shown in Table 1, Shapiro and Slemrod nd a large fraction of respondents with zero
stocks-market assets (43 percent), whose tendency to spend is higher than those with low
stocks levels. They interpret this group as non-savers, i.e., individuals who are permanently
borrowing constrained. Households with zero assets are absent from Table 5. This is consis-
tent with our interpretation of the model as reecting middle class households, which hold
at least a small amounts of assets.23
4.6 Interpreting Evidence on Consumption Growth Stickiness
We now turn to the calibrated model's quantitative implications for excess smoothness and
persistence of consumption growth. Since the time period in our model is one year, we begin
with a test of excess smoothness similar to Campbell and Deaton's (1989) quarterly analysis
23This is a result of the chosen calibration and not an intrinsic feature of the model. Increasing  to 15,
i.e., extending the cycle and correspondingly recalibrating , makes the borrowing constraint bind not only
in the expenditure year, but also in the following one,  = 1. In this case, therefore, households have zero
assets at the beginning and end of cycle year  = 1, while the corresponding MPC is high because then the
borrowing constraint binds. If we increase  further to 20, then the borrowing constraint binds for the rst
six years after the periodic expenditure. Hence, this model can generate a fraction of households with zero
assets and high MPC. However, these households would have zero assets only temporarily. They would not
constitute a separate group of permanently low-wealth households.












where r is the real interest rate, # is the constant ratio of nondurable consumption to total
consumption (assuming a constant relative price), At is current assets and Yt is disposable
labor income. This follows a random walk with drift: ln(Yt=Yt 1) =  + "t; "t  N(0;2):
All variables are measured at the household level, so  equals income growth per capita. This
income process implies24
(1 + r)





























1 + r   exp( + 2=2)
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where  denotes the rst-dierence operator, and At = A0 for all t: The latter holds be-
cause income innovations change consumption by exactly the same amount, without altering



















The approximation in (20) ignores the term A0=Ct; whose coecient, when setting a period
to one year, is small compared with the coecient of the income change term. Except for




< 1 + r.
31setting r = 0:04, we estimate the other terms in this equation using the sample 1983 2007:25
The data are per capita aggregate disposable labor income and nondurable consumption less
housing services. Excess smoothness is observed if SD(Ct=Ct) < SDpih (Ct=Ct):
The necessary estimates for this comparison are  = 0:017,  = 0:016, # = 0:723,
SD(Yt=Ct) = 0:016, and SD(Ct=Ct) = 0:008. The result is SDpih (Ct=Ct) = 0:020,
which is much larger than the standard deviation of actual consumption growth. Hence, the
\excess smoothness" stressed by Deaton (1987) and Campbell and Deaton (1989) appears
strongly in this sample. Note also that the volatility of income, , is much higher than the
volatility of consumption.
The sample displays also \consumption growth stickiness". The autocorrelation coecient
of consumption growth is 0:40 with a t-statistic of 2:36. This coecient is lower than the
annualized estimate in Carroll, Slacalek, and Sommer (2009) of 0:62, although it is not far
considering the estimate's standard error, 0:17.
We noted in Section 3.4 that the simple version of the model can qualitatively repro-
duce the excess smoothness and persistence of the data. To examine the calibrated model's
quantitative performance on this dimension, we calculate the response of aggregate consump-
tion following a permanent one percent wage increase for a population of ten households
evenly distributed across points in the nonstochastic cycle. We use this impulse response as
the innite moving-average representation of aggregate consumption in the face of a unit-
root income process with a one-percent standard deviation. Hence, for this calculation,
 = SDpih (Ct=Ct) = 0:01. With the calibrated parameters, SD(Ct=Ct) = 0:0067. Thus,
the model generates substantial excess smoothness. This occurs because aggregate consump-
tion responds initially by only 0:67 percent, and it then completes its long-run one-percent
adjustment slowly. This response generates also a small positive autocorrelation of consump-
tion growth, 0:11. Overall, we nd that liquidity constraints of households holding assets can
contribute to the resolution of the consumption smoothness and persistence puzzles.
5 Concluding Remarks
How liquidity constrained are middle-class households in the U.S.? To address this question,
we developed a model where households are home owners and hold nancial assets, and mea-
25This sample is chosen because of the drastic deregulation of the mortgage market in 1982 and the
dramatic macroeconomic events that began in August 2007; which aected substantially the nancial market
and hence the environment for dynamic optimization.
32sured liquidity constraints with the fraction spent out of a temporary tax rebate|compared
to the unconstrained Ricardian response of zero.
In the model, a future binding borrowing constraint eectively shortens the planning
horizon of households who are innite-horizon planners. These households value liquidity in
spite of being currently unconstrained. This model has two main implications:
 The spending responses to a transitory transfer in the model are much higher than for
a permanent-income consumer. The responses to a transitory transfer and to a tax cut
nanced by a future permanent tax hike are very similar. In other words, future tax
changes have little eect on current decisions. This implies that the response of these
households to a balanced-budget tax rebate diers greatly from the zero-response of a
Ricardian permanent-income consumer.
 The volume of assets owned reects a forthcoming demand for liquidity rather than a
liquidity surplus arising from past luck. This feature generates a positive relationship
between assets and the marginal propensity to consume out of temporary income.
The second implication provides a rationalization of the nding in Shapiro and Slemrod
(2003), that among households with positive amounts of shares, the fraction of households
who spent most of the 2001 rebate increases with stock ownership.
In the calibrated version of the model, the average MPC from a one-year tax cut is 24
percent. For a ve-year tax cut, it equals 66 percent. These gures are realistic given the
evidence on the 2001 tax rebate. Our interpretation of these results is that middle-class
households face quantitatively signicant liquidity constraints.
33Appendix: A Dynastic Foundation for the Model
This Appendix presents a dynastic overlapping generations model with perfect altruism and
tax-advantaged individual retirement accounts. The model's IRAs carry a rate of return high
enough to induce the dynasty's working members to save in them at the maximum allowed
rate and withdraw from them as slowly as legally possible. Each individual gains utility from
medical care at the end of life, which is a periodic expenditure for the dynasty. With these
preferences and savings opportunities, there is a deterministic cycle which is equivalent to
that of the innitely lived household considered in the text, with income redened as wages
less IRA contributions plus IRA withdrawals.
The calibration of our model considered the ratio of the nonretirement nancial assets
of working-age individuals to their disposable labor income net not only of taxes but also
of IRA contributions. We justify this strategy here using the dynastic model. For this,
we represent the dynasty's decisions by giving each member a separate ordinary savings
account. One implementation of the dynasty's consumption and savings plan has all dynasty
members maintaining identical balances in them. With the appropriate IRA contribution
limit, the only transfer payments required to equalize consumption are from working members
to the retiree to fund end-of-life medical care. In this case, the dynasty's ratio of ordinary
savings to current disposable income equals any working member's ratio of ordinary savings
to wages net of IRA contributions. Furthermore, the corner solution for IRA contributions
and withdrawals implies that the dynasty's marginal propensity to consume out of a given
income and tax shock equals the corresponding value from the model in the text.
A.1 Tax-Advantaged Retirement Savings in the U.S.
Current U.S. tax law provides two kinds of tax-advantaged vehicles for retirement savings.
The rst is the pre-tax contribution account. The leading examples are the IRA account,
its 401k and 403b variants, and numerous employer-sponsored plans. Generally, individuals
(and possibly their employers) may make limited contributions to their accounts' balances.
For example, in 2009, an individual may contribute up to $5,000 per year ($6,000 for those 50
and older) to an IRA. In most cases, these contributions are deductible from the individual's
current taxable income. Realized capital gains, dividends, and interest accumulate in the
account tax free thereafter. The IRS heavily penalizes withdrawals from these accounts
before the individual turns 591
2. After this date, it taxes withdrawals as ordinary income.
The IRS also imposes minimum withdrawals on those 701
2 or older. These approximately
34empty the account over the individual's expected remaining life.
The second kind of tax-advantaged retirement savings account, the Roth IRA, diers from
the traditional IRA in two respects. First, contributions to a Roth IRA account's balance
are not deductible from current income. Second, the IRS does not count withdrawals from
Roth IRA accounts towards current income. Contributions to a Roth IRA reduce dollar for
dollar the maximum contribution to a traditional IRA.26
The nancial benet from these retirement accounts comes from their favorable treatment
of interest, dividends, and capital gains. To see this, it is helpful to note that funding either
kind of account with the same consumption reduction yields the same after-tax resources
in retirement if the marginal tax rate is constant. Suppose an individual reduces current
consumption by $1 to purchase a security with gross return R? in the Roth IRA. In retirement,
the assets are $R?. If the individual faces a tax rate of  both while working and in retirement,
investing $1=(1   ) in a traditional IRA with the same gross return requires the same $1
reduction in current consumption and yields the same after-tax payout $(1   )  R=(1  
) = $R?: An after-tax dollar invested outside of a tax-advantaged account yields only
$(1 + (R?   1)  (1   )) < $R? in retirement, because the IRS taxes that capital income.
Since the two IRA accounts manifest their benets in a higher after-tax return on investment,
the model's IRA has this as its only advantage.
A.2 A Dynastic Model
Consider a dynasty of individuals with names i = 0;1;2;:::. Individual i is born in year i
and lives for  years. Hence, a new member is born every  years and there are  overlapping
living generations. Note that older individuals have smaller names, as with kings: Henry IV
preceded Henry V who in turn preceded Henry VI. An individual provides a labor supply N
in the rst (   1) years of life and is retired in the last  years. Each individual derives
utility from ordinary nondurable consumption and end-of-life care. We denote individual i's
consumption of these goods in year t with Ci
t and Mi









t =  > 0 when t = (i + )|the nal year of life|and i
t = 0 at other times.
All dynasty members discount future utility at the common rate 0 <  < 1, and they are
perfectly altruistic towards the dynasty's other members both born and unborn. Therefore,
they all rank consumption streams with the same utility function. We denote the name of
26Information about tax-advantaged retirement saving in the U.S. is available in IRS Publication 590.
35the youngest living dynasty member with i(t). The name of the oldest living member is















The dynasty members earn the wage Wt for each unit of time sold in the labor market.
They also have access to a bond market. They can purchase bonds through either an ordinary
savings or an individual retirement account. Their annual gross interest rates paid are R <
1= and R? > R. The rst inequality implies impatience, as in the text, and the wedge
between the two accounts' rates reects the exemption of the IRA's capital income from
taxation.
We denote the IRA balance of individual i at the end of year t   1 with Bi
t. The contri-
butions of i while working are Ii



















govern the evolution of the IRA account balances for working and retired members respec-
tively. IRA contributions of working-age individuals are restricted by:
0  I
i
t   I: (A4)
That is, contributions cannot be negative and may not exceed a legal limit of  I. A retired







where F(R?;i t) is a fraction of the available IRA balance|and a function of the IRA's rate
of return and the individual's life expectancy. In the U.S., the minimum IRA withdrawal rate






which is the current annuity per dollar when the interest rate is R and life expectancy is 
more years.
36The balance in the ordinary saving account is denoted Ai
t. Only the standard borrowing
constraint Ai


















t is i's transfers to other dynasty members, Tt equals the lump-sum tax bill, Ni = N




A.3 Optimal Consumption and Savings
The dyanasty's optimization problem coordinates within-dynasty transfers and savings de-
cisions to maximize total dynastic welfare subject to each individual's budget and asset
accumulation constraints and the dynasty's constraint that total within-dynasty transfers



















for t = 0;1;:::; and i;i0 = it;:::;i(t): Condition (A7) is the Euler equation allowing for an
occasionally binding borrowing constraint. Altruism requires the dynasty to equate con-
sumption across members in condition (A8), and condition (A9) equates the marginal utility
of end-of-life medical care with that for any member's ordinary consumption. Incorporating
the optimal equalization of consumption across members from (A8) into the utility function




t(lnCt + t lnMt): (A10)
Where t = 
i(t)
t .
We look for an optimum satisfying the following two conjectures:
Conjecture 4 Working members' IRA contributions equal their allowed maximum: Ii
t =  I
for i = it + 1;:::;i(t).















Conjecture 5 requires the withdrawals during retirement to equal F(R?;)B?. We now dene
the dynasty's net earnings as Yt = (   1)(WtN    I) + F(R?;)B?   Tt. With this we can
write the dynasty's budget constraint as
At+1 + Ct + Mt  Yt + RAt; (A11)
where At;Ct and Mt sum the ordinary savings, consumption, and end-of-life care across the
dynasty's members.
Note that maximizing (A10) subject to (A11) and At  0 is identical to the basic model's
problem presented in Section 3.1, subject only to the redenition of net income. Thus, the
equivalence of this dynastic model with the innite-horizon model in the text hinges on
whether or not Conjectures 4 and 5 apply: Under these two conjectures, income is exogenous
as in the model in the text.
A.3.1 The Deterministic Cycle
We assume here that Wt = W and Tt = T. If Conjectures 4 and 5 hold, the present
model generates a deterministic cycle in the same way as shown in Section 3.2, with Y =
( 1)(W T  I)+  J. In particular, Proposition 1 shows that either the borrowing constraint
always binds (  ^ ) or that there exists a ? <  such that A > 0 if and only if   ?
( > ^ ). For  < ?, C = Y . When A > 0, the Euler equation requires consumption to
shrink at the rate C+1=C = R. We use these results here to derive a condition on R?, R,
and  sucient for these conjectures to hold in the model's deterministic cycle.
Conrming Conjecture 4 requires to verify that the benet of the marginal IRA investment
in each of the (   1) years of an individual's working life exceeds its present utility cost.
Similarly, Conjecture 5 requires us to verify that the benets of leaving an investment in the
IRA during retirement exceeds the cost of doing so.
We rst examine an individual's IRA contribution in the last working year. If the individ-
ual expects to make always the minimum withdrawals from the IRA during retirement, then
investing the maximum contribution at the end of one's career squares with the dynasty's













38The left-hand side of (A12) is the utility cost of the marginal IRA contribution, and its
right-hand side equals the future utility gain from the contribution given that minimum IRA
withdrawal always binds.
We proceed by multiplying both sides of (A12) by C. The Euler inequality in (A7)
bounds C=C from below by (R) , so replacing each consumption ratio on the right-
hand side with its corresponding lower bound yeilds a lower bound for the entire right-hand






 2 + ::: + R + 1

: (A13)
Dividing and multiplying the right hand side by R and solving the resulting sum of a





In summary, (A14) guarantees that an individual at the brink of retirement makes the
largest allowable contribution to his IRA. It turns out that this condition also guarantees
that he makes the maximum contribution in all earlier years and withdraws the results during
retirement at the slowest possible rate. We show this in the the following proposition, which
ensures, as mentioned above, that there is a nonstochastic cycle in this model.
Proposition 6 The inequality in (A14) guarantees that Conjectures 4 and 5 hold good.
Proof. The proof proceeds in three steps. First, we show that (A14) implies that R?  1,
i.e., the IRA's rate of return dominates impatience. Second, this guarantees that retirees
withdraw from their IRAs as slowly as possible (Conjecture 5). Third, we demonstrate
that the ratio of utility benet to utility cost for any IRA contribution weakly exceeds the
analogous ratio from (A12) (Conjecture 4).
The IRA's return dominates impatience (R? > 1). In the noncyclical case of  = 1,




















R > 0: (A17)
The left-hand side of (A17) equals zero when evaluated at R = 1, and for R > 1, the




R+1 > 0: (A18)
Hence, for R > 1, (A17) holds. This in turn implies that g declines with R, and therefore
g(R?;) < g(R;) given that R? > R. Because the ratio of values of g in (A16) is less than
one, R? > 1.
IRA withdrawals equal their minima. We proceed to verify that R? > 1 implies that
Conjecture 5 holds. The minimum withdrawal leaves no room for choice in an individual's
nal year of life, but we must still consider the earlier years of retirement.
Starting from the minimum required, let us consider a marginal increase in the IRA
withdrawal. If the borrowing constraint does not bind in that year, then the dynasty is
indierent between the marginal utility of consuming one more unit in the present year at
the expense of the utility loss of consuming R less next year (the Euler condition holds with
equality). However, the additional withdrawal from the IRA implies a cost of R? > R next
year, and hence the dynasty will not withdraw the additional unit.
If the borrowing constraint does bind, consumption levels in the present and next year
both equal Y . Thus, the relevant utility comparison involves only consumption units. The
withdrawal produces one additional unit of consumption this year, at the expense of a present
value loss of R? next year. Since this exceeds one, the dynasty will not withdraw the
additional unit in this case either. Hence, Conjecture 5 must hold.
IRA contributions equal their maxima. The discussion preceeding Proposition 6 demon-
strates that (A14) guarantees that a worker's nal IRA contribution equals its maximum.
We proceed to consider the contributions made  years before retirement for 1 <   , i.e.,
in earlier years of the last expenditure cycle before retirement. The benet of the marginal
















40Multiplying both sides through by C and using the Euler inequality in (A7)|as in the







Since R? > 1, the right-hand side of (A19) exceeds the right-hand side of (A14). Further-
more, its left-hand side is weakly less than one because C  C. Therefore, (A14) implies
that (A19) holds good.
The remaining case to consider is a marginal IRA contribution during an earlier expendi-
ture cycle. (That is, when the individual's working life has more than  years left.) Suppose
that it occurs in year  of that cycle. Its contemporaneous utility cost is the same as that
in (A19), while its appropriately discounted utility benet is that on the right-hand side
of (A19) multiplied by (R?)( )j for some j > 1. Therefore, the condition guaranteeing
that the marginal IRA contributions in the nal  years of work increase utility ensures that
earlier contributions do as well. Thus, Conjecture 4 is correct if (A14) holds good.
Finally, the next proposition shows that (A14) is consistent with the basic assumption of
impatience.
Proposition 7 Given any R > 1 and R? > R, there exist values of  < 1=R such that
(A14) holds good.
Proof. The proof simply demonstrates the intuitive result that F(R;) is increasing in R,
so that if we set R arbitrarily close to 1 then (A14) holds. Let f(R;)  ln(F(R;)) =




















Evaluated at  = 1, this derivative equals 1=R. Therefore, if we can show that @2f(R;)=(@R@) >



























41satises both the inital assumption that R < 1 and (A14). Since F(R?;) > F(R;), this
interval is non-empty.
If we use R = 1:04 from Table 4, set the marginal tax rate at  = :30, and assume that
R? = 1 + (R   1)=(1   ), then R? = 1:0595. With these rates, the value of  from Table 4
1=1:055 satises (A14).
A.3.2 The Marginal Propensity to Consume
With the condition ensuring that the dynasty fully exploits its IRA investment opportunities
in the deterministic cycle established, we may proceed to consider the dynasty's marginal
propensity to consume. When the dynasty strictly prefers to exploit fully its IRA investment
opportunities, a marginal change to the dynasty's net earnings (either presently or in the
future) leaves this choice unchanged. In this case, we can calculate the optimal consumption
and savings responses while holding the IRA contributions and withdrawals xed. As noted
above, the dynasty's utility maximization problem is isomorphic to that of the model in the
text. Hence, the analysis of small policy changes in this model is the same as in Section 3.
A.3.3 Durable Goods
The quantitative results in the text come from a version of the model with durable goods
and collateralized household debt. Extending the dynastic model to include durable goods
is straightforward. Each individual accumulates and maintains a stock of durable goods,
and the oldest generation bequeaths its stock to the newly-born youngest generation. As
with nondurable goods, optimality requires the dynasty to distribute durable goods services
equally across its living members. If we impose the maximum IRA contributions and min-
imum IRA withdrawals on that dynasty, then its utility maximization problem is identical
to that considered in Section 3.5. In that case, we can interpret the computational results
reported in the text as the outcome of the dynasty's utility maximization problem. It is
not hard to show that the inequality in (A14) guarantees that the dynastic analogue to the
innite-horizon model with durable goods has a deterministic cycle in which Conjectures
4 and 5 hold good if nondurable consumption in the innite horizon model rises only im-
mediately after the periodic expenditure. This is so for the parameter values we use, so
the dynastic analysis of this Appendix applies to the model used to create our quantitative
results.
42A.4 Calibration
Assume that the IRA contribution ceiling is such that the resulting annuity equals labor
income net of IRA contributions (I) of a working member. That is







This says that IRA withdrawals are sucient to fund all regular consumption of retirees plus
their proportional share of end-of-life expenditures (100= percent). Although income and
expenditures are equalized, the individual members' assets are still indeterminate, given that
dierent asset distributions can be supported by appropriate transfer schemes. This inde-
terminacy is resolved by the additional assumption that the only transfers across members
are workers' contributions to retirees' medical expenditures. This is realistic for the United
States, given that large intervivos transfers not for educational or medical expenses are sub-
ject to gift taxes. These motivate avoiding unnecessary transfers. With equal income and
equal expenditures year by year, non-retirement assets are also equalized across working and





t =  = A
it
t : (A22)
These asumptions have direct bearing on the calibration of the parameters  and . Because
retirement saving is fully accounted for by formal retirement saving, non-retirement assets
are only for the periodic expenditure. The average balance should then reect the utility
parameter  as well as the time between expenditures, . Given that all variables in the
model are proportional to exogenous net labor income, we can calibrate these parameters so
that the model's ratio
Ai
t




equals the corresponding ratio for working age individuals. Because this model is identical to
the model in the text, we adopt this procedure for the calibration in Section 4.2. The actual
value of I in the United states is probably insucient to nance all expenditures in retirement,
but the dynastic model omits for simplicity pay-as-you-go public pensions. Incorporating a
transfer to retirees nanced by payroll taxes on younger generations is straightforward and
alters no substantial result. In light of this, we nd (A21) empirically plausible.
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